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Abstract 
In this paper we study the vulnerability of parliamentary voting procedures to strategic candidacy. Candidates involved 
in an election are susceptible to influence the outcome by opting out or opting in. In the context of three-alternative 
elections and under the impartial anonymous culture assumption, we evaluate the frequencies of such strategic 
candidacy opportunities. 
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     1 Introduction
In social choice theory the main result on strategic voting is the Gibbard-Satterthwaite (Gibbard
1973, Sattethwaite 1975) theorem, which states that there is no voting rule selecting a unique
outcome which is both nondictatorial and immune to individual misrepresentation of preferences.
In this paper we are concerned with a related but di⁄erent aspect of strategic behavior: a
potential candidate in an election may have an incentive to change the outcome of the voting
rule in his favour by his simple entry or exit, given the preferences of the voters. Such a behavior
is known as strategic candidacy.
Strategic candidacy has been studied by several authors. For example, Dutta, Jackson and
Le Breton (2000, 2001), Samejima (2007) provide many results on this topic.
Although each of the above mentioned papers studies incentives related to strategic candidacy
or classes of voting rules immune to strategic candidacy, the focus of our paper is quite di⁄erent.
Our contribution in this paper is to evaluate the vulnerability of parliamentary voting procedures
to strategic candidacy. Speci￿cally, we examine the vulnerability to strategic candidacy of
amendment and successive elimination voting procedures (see details in Section 2), which are
extensively used throughout the world for voting on motions in parliaments (see for example
Rasch, 2000) and are the topic of the article of Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (2000). More
precisely, under these rules and in the context of three-alternative elections, our aim is to
determine how frequent opportunities of this phenomenon are. We do this for the two versions
of strategic candidacy mentioned above: opting out, and opting in.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we introduce notations and de￿nitions; Section
3 is devoted to the evaluation of strategic candidacy opportunities and provides our results.
Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Notations and de￿nitions
Consider an election in which A = fa1;a2;a3g is a ￿nite set of three alternatives or potential
candidates, and N is the set of n individuals or voters, whose preferences are aggregated in
order to determine the elected candidate. We also assume that candidates are allowed to vote,
as it is the case in many elections.
Individual preference relations are linear orders (complete, transitive and antisymmetric
binary relations) over the set of A candidates.
We now de￿ne the voting procedures considered in this paper. We begin with the amendment
procedure. It consists in organizing a succession of quali￿ed majority (with quota ￿) contests
between alternatives in the following way: using an agenda - a predetermined order, a1a2a3 in
this paper - between the alternatives, a1 is taken against a2, and then winner is taken against
a3. The winner of this last confrontation is declared elected. Next, as for the amendment rule,
successive elimination procedure is based on an agenda, though in a slightly di⁄erent way: at
the ￿rst step a (possibly quali￿ed) majority yes-no vote is organized on a1, and if a1 wins a
majority, a1 is elected and the procedure ends. If not, at the second step a similar vote is
organized on a2, and a2 is elected if it collects a majority of votes. If neither a1 nor a2 collect a
majority of votes, then a3 is elected. Note that, when individuals vote on a1, they must in fact
decide whether they prefer alternative a1 to the subset fa2;a3g or fa2;a3g to a1. In other words,
1they compare subsets of alternatives of possibly more than one element. Then, we distinguish
two possible types of behavior: maximin (a pessimistic behavior), or maximax (an optimistic
behavior). Under maximin behavior, a voter does not vote for a candidate only when he ranks
him (or her) at the last position in his preference order. Under maximax behavior, a voter votes
for a candidate when he ranks him at the ￿rst position in his preference order.
Under either voting procedure, ties are broken in favor of the one with the greatest index.
Strategic candidacy occurs when some candidate can exit (or enter) the election and change
the outcome in his favor. In order to give some formal de￿nitions of these notions, we need
additional notations. Let F be the voting procedure and RN = (R1;:::;Rn) denote a pro￿le
of individual preferences, one preference relation Ri for each individual i. Let RNjA ￿ fahg =
(R1jA ￿ fahg;:::;RnjA ￿ fahg) denote the restriction of every individual preferences to the sub-
set A ￿ fahg of alternatives.
A voting procedure F is vulnerable to strategic candidacy at pro￿le RN by opting out if
there exist ah 2 A and some pro￿le RN such that F(RNjA ￿ fahg)RahF(RN).
A voting procedure F is vulnerable to strategic candidacy at pro￿le RN by opting in if there
exist ah 2 A and some pro￿le RN such that F(RN) 6= ah and F(RN)RahF(RNjA ￿ fahg).
ah is a potential candidate, and by opting out, his exiting leads to the election a candidate
he prefers to the one who is elected with the whole set A of alternatives. Note that it is required,
for opting in, that ah be not not elected when he enters the election; this is so because it is
always possible to construct a pro￿le at which ah is elected, for example by ranking it at the
￿rst position in all individual preferences.
3 Evaluation of strategic candidacy opportunities
In this section we characterize, for each of the voting procedures under consideration, all voting
situations at which there exists an opportunity for strategic candidacy. We successively study
opting out and opting in. We begin with opting out. Note that, as said in Section 2, we assume
that candidates are allowed to vote. This implies that each alternative appears at least once at
the ￿rst position in individual preferences; and this fact is taken into consideration in all the
analysis below.
3.1 Opting out
Under the amendment procedure, one can easily check that where there is a Condorcet winner,
that is an alternative that beats any other alternative in pairwise majority contests, there is no
way for strategic candidacy. And since a1 or a2 are elected if and only if they are Condorcet
winners, the only possibilities for strategic candidacy occur when a3 is elected. Since a3 has no
reason to opt out when (s)he wins, there are only under two possibilities: (i) either a1 opts out
(see Example 1), or a2 opts out (and the reader can easily construct a very similar example):
2Example 1 Consider the following pro￿le and ￿ = 1
2
RN RNjfa2;a3g
1 2 3 1 2 3
a1 a2 a3 a2 a2 a3
a2 a3 a1 a3 a3 a2
a3 a1 a2
a1 beats a2, a3 beats a1; then a3 wins. If a1 opts out, a2 beats a3 and it follows that a2 wins.
We then conclude that a1 is a strategic candidate.
All the observations above can more precisely be summarized in the proposition below.
Proposition 1 With A = fa1;a2;a3g, AmP is vulnerable to strategic candidacy at some pro￿le
RN by opting out if there is an ￿￿majority cycle over A at RN.
In other words, Proposition 1 says the amendment rule is vulnerable to strategic candidacy
opting out if at some pro￿le RN there exists some i such that Ri = a1a2a3, a1 beats a2, a3 beats
a1 and a2 beats a3 or Ri = a2a1a3, a2 beats a1, a3 beats a2 and a1 beats a3.
We next study successive elimination under maximin and maximax behavior.
Under successive elimination with maximin behavior (SE min), when a2 is elected, there is
no way for strategic candidacy by opting out. This so because a1 is ranked last by a majority
of winners and a2 beats a3. For exactly similar reasons the conclusion is the same when a3 is
elected. Then, the only possibilities appear when a1 is elected, as illustrated in the example
below.
Example 2 Consider the following pro￿le and ￿ = 1
2
RN RNjfa1;a3g
1 2 3 1 2 3
a1 a2 a3 a1 a3 a3
a2 a3 a1 a3 a1 a1
a3 a1 a2
a1 beats fa2a3g, then a1 wins. If a2 opts out, a3 beats a1 and then a3 wins. a2 is a strategic
candidate.
The following proposition describes all cases at which strategic candidacy by opting out is
susceptible to occur.
Proposition 2 SE min is vulnerable to strategic candidacy at pro￿le RN by opting out if there
exists some i such that
(i) Ri = a2a3a1, a1 beats fa2;a3g and a3 beats a1 or
(ii) Ri = a3a2a1, a1 beats fa2;a3g and a2 beats a1.
Under successive elimination with maximax behavior (SE max), no strategic candidacy is
possible when a1 is elected since this requires that more than half the number of voters rank it
￿rst. But when a2 or a3 is elected, such situations become possible:
3Example 3 Consider the following pro￿le and ￿ = 1
2
RN RNjfa1;a2g
1 2 3 1 2 3
a1 a2 a3 a1 a2 a1
a2 a1 a1 a2 a1 a2
a3 a3 a2
fa2a3g beats a1; a2 beats a3, then a2 wins. If a3 opts out, a1 beats a2 and a1 wins. a3 is a
strategic candidate.
Proposition 3 SE max is vulnerable to strategic candidacy at RN by opting out if there exists
some i such that
(i) Ri = a3a1a2, fa2a3g beats a1, a2 beats a3 and a1 beats a2 or
(ii) Ri = a2a1a3, fa2a3g beats a1, a3 beats a2 and a1 beats a3.
3.2 Opting in
As above, we begin with amendment procedure. The reader can easily check that the only
cases where strategic candidacy is susceptible to occur are when a3 is elected at the unrestricted
pro￿le RN. In some of those cases, it will be possible to restrict the pro￿le to RNjA ￿ fa2g or
to RNjA ￿ fa1g, so that a1 or a2 is elected, as is illustrated in Example 4.
Example 4 Consider the following pro￿le and ￿ = 1
2
RNjfa1;a3g RN
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
a3 a1 a3 a1 a1 a2 a2 a3 a1 a1
a1 a3 a1 a3 a3 a3 a1 a2 a3 a3
a1 a3 a1 a2 a2
a1 beats a3, then a1 wins. If a2 opts in, a2 beats a1;a3 beats a2, then a3 wins. a2 is a
strategic candidate. And it appears that RN is be a cycle. To put it in another way, beginning
with RNjfa1;a3g, the complete pro￿le - after the entry of a2 - is vulnerable to strategic candidacy
if and only if a2 enters in such a way that RN leads to a cycle.
All such pro￿les are summarized in the proposition below.
Proposition 4 AmP is vulnerable to strategic candidacy at pro￿le RN by opting in if there
exists an ￿￿majority cycle over A at RN.
In other words, if there is an ￿￿majority at RN, then one can always construct a restriction
of RN at which some candidate will ￿nd it pro￿table to enter the election.
Under successive elimination with maximin behavior, cases of strategic candidacy occur only
when a2 or a3 is elected at the unrestricted pro￿le, as shown in Example 5 and summarized by
Proposition 5.
4Example 5 Consider the following pro￿le and ￿ = 1
2
RNjfa1;a2g RN
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
a1 a1 a2 a2 a2 a3 a1 a2 a2 a2
a2 a2 a1 a1 a1 a1 a2 a1 a1 a3
a2 a3 a3 a3 a1
a2 beats a1 then a2 wins. If a3 opts in, a1 beats fa2;a3g then a1 wins. a3 is a strategic
candidate.
Proposition 5 SE min is vulnerable to strategic candidacy at RN by opting in if there exists
some i such that
(i) Ri = a3a1a2, a2 beats a1 and a1 beats fa2;a3g or
(ii) Ri = a2a1a3, a3 beats a1 and a1 beats fa2;a3g.
Under successive elimination with maximax behavior, strategic candidacy occurs only when
a1 is elected.
Example 6 Consider the following pro￿le and ￿ = 1
2
RNjfa1;a3g RN
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
a1 a1 a3 a1 a3 a2 a1 a3 a1 a2
a3 a3 a1 a3 a1 a1 a3 a2 a3 a3
a3 a2 a1 a2 a1
a1 beats a3 then a1 wins. If a2 opts in, fa2a3g beats a1;a3 beats a2, then a3 wins. a2 is a
strategic candidate.
Proposition 6 SE max is vulnerable to strategic candidacy at pro￿le RN by opting in if there
exists some i such that
(i) Ri = a2a3a1, a1 beats a3, fa2a3g beats a1 and a3 beats a2 or
(ii) Ri = a3a2a1, a1 beats a2, fa2a3g beats a1 and a2 beats a3.
3.3 Susceptibility to strategic candidacy
As said in the introduction of this paper, we are concerned with the quantitative evaluation
of strategic candidacy opportunities. Our calculations will be based on a speci￿c probabilistic
model, known under the name of impartial anonymous culture (IAC); under IAC, voters are
anonymous, in the sense that their identity does not matter: if we permute the preferences
of two individuals, this will have no consequence on the outcome of the vote. Two pro￿les of
preferences are considered as identical if in these two pro￿les the number of voters having a
given type of preference relation is the same. With A = fa1;a2;a3g, the preference relation Ri
of a given voter i is one of the following six possible linear orders: R1 : a1a2a3; R2 : a1a3a2;
R3 : a2a1a3; R4 : a2a3a1; R5 : a3a1a2; R6 : a3a2a1. Let nj denote the number of voters whose
5preference relation is Rj (j = 1;2;:::;6). Then,we must have n1 + n2 + n3 + n4 + n5 + n6 = n.
Consequently in the sequel, instead of pro￿les in the sense de￿ned above, we consider voting
situations or simply situations, de￿ned as vectors of the form s = (n1;n2;n3;n4;n5;n6). Strategic
candidacy frequencies will be calculated on the basis of this following ratio:
Number of voting situations at which strategic candidacy is possible
Total number of voting situations
The method used to compute these frequencies is based on Gehrlein and Fishburn (1976)
and is the same as the one in Mbih, Moyouwou and Picot (2008). All technical details are
available from the authors upon simple request. Here, in order to illustrate, we simply provide an
example of closed form formulae giving the frequencies for successive elimination with maximax
and opting out when the quota ￿ is equal to 1
2; these formulae are obtained from systems of
linear inequalities describing all voting situations at which strategic candidacy by opting out is
susceptible to arise.
Proposition 7 For all ￿ such that 0 < ￿ ￿ 1, successive elimination with maximax is vulnerable
to strategic candidacy by opting out if and only if
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
n3 + n4 + n5 + n6 ￿ ￿n
n1 + n3 + n4 > n ￿ ￿n
n1 + n2 + n5 > n ￿ ￿n
n1 + n2 ￿ 1
n3 + n4 ￿ 1
n5 ￿ 1
n1 + n2 + n3 + n4 + n5 + n6 = n
or
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
n3 + n4 + n5 + n6 ￿ ￿n
n2 + n5 + n6 ￿ ￿n
n1 + n2 + n3 > n ￿ ￿n
n1 + n2 ￿ 1
n5 + n6 ￿ 1
n3 ￿ 1
n1 + n2 + n3 + n4 + n5 + n6 = n
Applying the Gehrlein-Fishburn technique, we then obtain the following result:
Proposition 8 When ￿ = 1
2 and n ￿ 3, then the frequency of successive elimination with
maximax to strategic candidacy by opting out is given by
(
20n+3n2+33
160n+16n2￿384 if n is odd
464n+172n2+36n3+3n4
944n2￿272n+272n3+16n4￿960 if n is even
Table 1 in the appendix gives theoretical frequencies of strategic candidacy, with respect to
the number of voters.
4 Concluding remarks
The main information brought by this work is how frequent parliamentary voting procedures,
and speci￿cally amendment and successive elimination voting rules, are vulnerable to strategic
candidacy. First, it appears that they are vulnerable for any quota ￿. In particular, when
￿ = 1
2, for large electorates the vulnerability is 6:25% for amendment voting procedure, and
650% and 18:75% for successive elimination voting procedure with maximin and with maximax,
respectively. The amendment voting procedure is vulnerable to strategic candidacy only in the
presence of Condorcet cycles.
For any number of voters, successive elimination voting procedure appears to be much more
vulnerable to strategic candidacy than amendment voting rule. Besides, notice that the fre-
quency under maximin (50%) is much more signi￿cant than under maximax (18:75%).
It is also worth noting that the vulnerability with respect to the number of voters is a
decreasing function for opting out and an increasing one for opting in.
One can imagine many directions at which the results in this paper can be generalized
and expanded; we only cite a few of them here: the evaluation of the rules studied in this
paper under the hypothesis of sophisticated behavior as de￿ned in Farquharson (1969) and
subsequently developed in more recent research, the use of other probabilistic models (impartial
culture, maximal culture), the possibility of di⁄erent quotas in pairwise contests, etc. It will
doubtless also be of interest to examine the vulnerability of positional rules (plurality, anti-
plurality, Borda) to strategic candidacy.
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7Appendix
Table 1. Frequencies of strategic candidacy for amendment and successive
elimination rules for ￿ = 1
2
Opting out Opting in
n AP SE min SE max
3 0.25 0.5 0.5
4 0.138889 0.333333 0.222222
5 0.117647 0.372549 0.254902
6 0.103896 0.34632 0.186147
7 0.092105 0.366228 0.210526
8 0.089133 0.361416 0.173382
9 0.081633 0.372449 0.193878
10 0.081267 0.374656 0.168044
11 0.076087 0.380737 0.18599
12 0.076512 0.385849 0.165775
15 0.070513 0.396368 0.179487
18 0.069659 0.410284 0.165164
21 0.066986 0.414428 0.177033
24 0.066867 0.426187 0.166917
27 0.065385 0.427404 0.176923
30 0.065447 0.437311 0.168872
33 0.064516 0.43704 0.177419
36 0.064625 0.445522 0.170638
39 0.06399 0.444446 0.17806
42 0.064105 0.45183 0.172158
45 0.063647 0.450306 0.178703
48 0.063756 0.456828 0.173457
51 0.063411 0.455053 0.1793
54 0.06351 0.460886 0.174569
57 0.063241 0.458976 0.179842
60 0.06333 0.464246 0.175526
63 0.063115 0.462271 0.180328
66 0.063194 0.467074 0.176357
1 0.0625 0.5 0.1875
n AP SE min SE max
3 0 0 0
4 0 0.222222 0
5 0.019608 0.176471 0.039216
6 0.021645 0.255411 0.034632
7 0.026316 0.232456 0.057018
8 0.029304 0.282051 0.052503
9 0.030612 0.266764 0.069971
10 0.033517 0.303489 0.065197
11 0.033816 0.291667 0.080314
12 0.036405 0.321061 0.075278
15 0.038462 0.326923 0.096154
18 0.04193 0.358797 0.097052
21 0.043062 0.36106 0.112624
24 0.045377 0.383308 0.111644
27 0.046154 0.383654 0.124038
30 0.047808 0.400536 0.122177
33 0.048387 0.39983 0.132428
36 0.049628 0.413316 0.130144
39 0.050079 0.412018 0.138857
42 0.051045 0.423178 0.136382
45 0.051408 0.421542 0.143941
48 0.5218 0.431021 0.141399
51 0.052478 0.429196 0.148063
54 0.05311 0.437409 0.14552
57 0.05336 0.435484 0.151473
60 0.053886 0.442712 0.148966
63 0.054098 0.440743 0.154339
66 0.054544 0.447186 0.15189
1 0.0625 0.5 0.1875
8